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THREE PERSPECTIVES
ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE
INTRODUCTION
Michael T. Cahill*
The three contributors to this symposium all offer interesting
and useful empirical material and draw provocative conclusions
from that material. Any serious student of criminal law should find
each of these contributions individually compelling and
informative; together, they practically comprise a primer on
contemporary issues in and social-science approaches to criminal
law.
The articles offer such cumulative impact and utility because
the authors cover so much ground. While the authors share some
core concerns as to the criminal justice system’s reputation and as
to improving the satisfaction of its participants, they offer three
very different visions of criminal justice. One might say that they
collectively focus on the “three P’s” of the justice system:
punishment, procedure, and participation.
Professor Darley discusses justice as proper punishment.1 That
is to say, he deals with the substantive question of how to balance
crime and punishment. In its support for “just deserts” rather than
an explicitly deterrence-oriented agenda, his vision suggests a
backward-looking approach: it sees the punishment as a response
to the crime rather than a purely instrumental means of achieving
* Assistant Professor, Brooklyn Law School. Many thanks to the other
participants in the Three Perspectives on Criminal Justice conference, which
was held at Brooklyn Law School on January 30, 2004, and to Professor Larry
Solan and the School’s Center for the Study of Law, Language and Cognition
for organizing it.
1
See John M. Darley, On the Unlikely Prospects of Reducing Crime Rates
by Increasing the Severity of Prison Sentences, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 189 (2005).
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some future goal (though he has argued that such a desert-based
approach also yields utilitarian benefits).
Professor Heuer examines justice as fair procedure.2 Here too a
balancing act takes place, but the interests being balanced are those
of the state (as law enforcer) and the individual accused. One
might also say that the proceduralist’s vision looks neither
backward nor forward, but focuses its attention on the present
moment. That is, the proceduralist is not concerned with the
relation between the punishment and the crime, or with any
benefits that might later flow from that punishment, but with the
nature and propriety of the process that the system employs to
arrive at the chosen punishment. Heuer’s work suggests that the
factors underlying the perception of a process as “fair” are
complex and difficult to pin down, and may include an individual’s
relative position within the system.
Professor O’Hara focuses on the system’s participants: the
people affected by the system, whether defendants, victims, or
others.3 Her discussion of the role of victims in the criminal
process implicates a vision of justice as a resolution or
reconciliation that brings closure and thereby facilitates progress
for all affected parties rather than merely enabling the state’s
imposition of punishment on an offender. In her analysis, the
balance to be achieved directly relates to the interests of the victim
as well as the wrongdoer. In its ultimately instrumental approach—
its desire for movement toward a better social situation, here
meaning one in which both offenders and victims are made
whole—O’Hara’s vision might be described as more forwardlooking than either Darley’s or Heuer’s. O’Hara’s conception may
also be more aspirational and affirmative, as it seeks the realization
of some positive good rather than the satisfaction of minimal,
required goals or rules.
Though these are very different visions, they are not
necessarily in direct tension; they are not offered as mutually
exclusive options that squarely conflict with one another. All three
2

See Larry Heuer, What’s Just About the Criminal Justice System?: A
Psychological Perspective, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 209 (2005).
3
See Erin Ann O’Hara, Victim Participation in the Criminal Process, 13
J.L. & POL’Y 229 (2005).
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authors identify distinct problems with the present state of the
criminal-justice system, yet their solutions to these problems seem
entirely compatible, at least at first glance. Does this mean we can
have all three of the P’s—just punishment, fair process, and full
participation—at the same time? Could we create a system that
reflects all of these values without developing conflicts or
requiring compromises between them? Or alternatively, are these
general perspectives so fundamentally at odds as to talk past each
other, so that any effort to devise concrete, specific methods for
implementing them will be doomed to incoherence and confusion?
I offer here no firm conclusion to these questions, only a reminder
that the apparent harmony of these perspectives might fade when
they are placed in a particular context that demands specific
decisions.
Further, although the three views put forth in the following
articles are very different, the articles provoke some general
responses, three of which I will briefly discuss. The first is a
question about priorities. The debate between substance and
procedure is hardly new, but both Darley’s and Heuer’s work place
this debate in a somewhat new context. The authors do not advance
a principled normative commitment to either substance or
procedure, nor do they take a clear moral stance as to whether or
when one should trump the other. Instead, their work poses a
related but distinct empirical question: not “which is more
important,” but “which do people think is more important?”
Heuer’s work (as well as the larger underlying body of work
to which he refers) suggests that people care about procedure as a
value, even independently of the tendency of proper procedures to
ensure accuracy. At the same time, Darley points to widely shared
and deeply held intuitions about substantive justice, in that people
tend to support punishment based on “just deserts.” Of course,
people desire both fair process and appropriate substantive results.
This leads us to the question about priorities: how much do people
care about process as opposed to substance when the two conflict?4
4

The work of Linda J. Skitka, among others, finds that perceptions of the
significance of procedural fairness recede, perhaps to the point of irrelevance,
when people consider the substantive outcome to have a moral dimension—as is
surely true of many criminal cases, possibly to an extent unmatched by any other
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To be more specific, focusing on an issue in which I take a
personal interest,5 what happens when there is a categorical
procedural rule, grounded in notions of fair play, that seems likely
in many (if not all) cases to impede rather than promote the
achievement of an accurate outcome on the merits? Do people
prefer a “fair” process—whatever that means—or a correct result?
The empirical work of Heuer and others suggests that fairness is a
thorny, multivariate issue, and the literature thus far strikes me as
mixed, or else uniformly inconclusive, on this question.6 Perhaps
part of the law. See Linda J. Skitka & David A. Houston, When Due Process Is
of No Consequence: Moral Mandates and Presumed Defendant Guilt or
Innocence, 14 SOC. JUST. RES. 305 (2001); see also Linda J. Skitka, Do the
Means Always Justify the Ends, or Do the Ends Sometimes Justify the Means? A
Value Protection Model of Justice, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL.
588 (2002); Linda J. Skitka & Elizabeth Mullen, Understanding Judgments of
Fairness in a Real-World Political Context: A Test of the Value Protection
Model of Justice Reasoning, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1419
(2002); Linda J. Skitka & Elizabeth Mullen, The Dark Side of Moral Conviction,
2 ANALYSES OF SOC. ISSUES & PUB. POL’Y 35 (2002).
5
See PAUL H. ROBINSON & MICHAEL T. CAHILL, LAW WITHOUT JUSTICE:
HOW, AND WHY, CRIMINAL LAW SACRIFICES DESERT ch.7 (Oxford U. Press,
forthcoming 2005).
6
For a discussion of the relative strengths and weaknesses of morality
(substance) versus legitimacy (procedure) as methods of inducing compliance,
see generally Tom R. Tyler & John M. Darley, Building a Law-Abiding Society:
Taking Public Views About Morality and the Legitimacy of Legal Authorities
into Account when Formulating Substantive Law, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 707,
724–37 (2000). For indications of the relative importance of substance, see
works cited supra note 4; TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 59-60 &
Table 5.1 (1990) (study showing that compliance with law has much stronger
correlation with its connection to “personal morality” than with its perceived
“legitimacy”); id. at 32-37 (comparing past studies finding higher correlation
based on law’s instantiation of shared normative views than on perception of
legitimacy); id. at 60 (“The most important normative influence on compliance
with the law is the person’s assessment that following the law accords with his
or her sense of right and wrong[.]”); id. at 68 (“[P]ersonal morality is clearly a
more important influence on compliance than legitimacy.”); Harold G.
Grasmick & Robert J. Bursik, Jr., Conscience, Significant Others, and Rational
Choice: Extending the Deterrence Model, 24 L. & SOC’Y REV. 837, 853–54
(1990); Harold G. Grasmick & Donald E. Green, Legal Punishment, Social
Disapproval and Internalization as Inhibitors of Illegal Behavior, 71 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 325, 334 (1980) (stating that certain variables, including
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O’Hara’s work says something about this debate, at least as it is
played out in the area of victims’ involvement in the system. There
is an interesting interplay between victims’ desire to have
substantive authority over punishment versus mere participation or
voice in the process.7 Further exploration of this dynamic may
teach us about the layperson’s perception of the relationship
between substance and procedure.
The second issue, which relates to the first, concerns the
overlaps and distinctions involved in offering a descriptive
observation as compared to a normative justification or policy
prescription. A recurring issue with respect to law in a democracy
is the extent to which law should track people’s preferences (give
them what they want) and the extent to which law should try to
shape people’s preferences (tell them, or at least suggest, what to
“moral commitment” and “threat of social disapproval,” act as factors inhibiting
illegal behavior).
For indications of the relative importance of procedure, see TYLER, supra,
at 63 (“Respondents are almost equally likely to comply with the law because
they view it as legitimate . . . whether or not they think their peers would
disapprove of law breaking, and whether or not they think law breaking is
morally wrong.”); HERBERT C. KELMAN & V. LEE HAMILTON, CRIMES OF
OBEDIENCE: TOWARD A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF AUTHORITY AND
RESPONSIBILITY 89 (1989) (“Once a demand is categorized as legitimate, the
person to whom it is addressed enters a situation where his personal preferences
become more or less irrelevant . . . .”); id. at 16 (“Through authorization, the
situation becomes so defined that the individual is absolved of the responsibility
to make personal moral choices . . . . [A] different kind of morality, linked to the
duty to obey superior orders, tends to take over.”). See also DAVID BEETHAM,
THE LEGITIMATION OF POWER 4-5 (1991); Mark C. Suchman, Managing
Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 571,
579 & n.2 (1995).
Indeed, Heuer’s work indicates that substance and fairness perceptions are
deeply intertwined. For decisionmakers, the two seem almost inseparable. See
Heuer, supra note 2, at Part II.A. Even for the parties to a legal dispute, a
complex link between substance and fairness appears to follow from the
conclusion that notions of “deservingness” (which often seem to be connected to
the substantive merits of one’s position) are closely tied to perceptions of
procedural fairness. See Heuer, supra note 2, at Part II.B.
7
See O’Hara, supra note 3, at 246-47 (noting victim interest in both
substantive results, such as obtaining conviction, and procedural role, such as
having a voice in the proceedings, even if participation does not affect outcome).
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want). This issue resonates with all three authors, in my view,
because their work relies on empirics, but also often implies policy
prescriptions. Yet absent an independent normative judgment, data
about human psychology might suggest at least three very different
bases for policy: (1) policy should simply follow from our shared
psychological intuitions; (2) shared psychology is not decisive, but
suggests a norm that could ground policy choices; or (3) to the
contrary, sound policy demands active steps to overcome our
natural psychological inclinations or biases. A fourth option—a
more modest claim, and perhaps the only one these authors are
embracing—is that researchers and advocates should simply be
aware of the empirical data, even if the data’s normative
implications are up for grabs.
Tying the second issue directly to the first issue, if research
indicates that people value process significantly, perhaps even
more than substantive outcomes, is that a good thing? Should we
structure the system to reflect that view, or try to shift attitudes
away from a focus on process and toward attention to just results?
Further, if apparently process-related issues such as respect depend
on deservingness, as Heuer indicates, how are judges and others to
decide how much respect is appropriate, other than by weighing
the apparent substantive merits?
Darley hints that lay norms of justice (the desire for desert)
should inform criminal law doctrine and that the doctrine, in turn,
may help promote adherence to the law by strengthening respect
for the underlying norms. But one might ask whether we should
trust lay intuitions of justice if they are incoherent or not clearly
morally defensible. On the other side, is the law the best
mechanism for promoting norms—or for promoting social contexts
that facilitate adherence to norms—or should we rely on extralegal
avenues, such as moral instruction in educational or even religious
institutions?
The third issue I find relevant to all three articles relates to the
role of law enforcement as opposed to law. Darley, for example,
suggests that deterrence is hard to achieve through increasing
criminal penalties, but I think he would still agree that deterrence is
important. That forces us, if we still seek to pursue deterrence, to
focus on increasing either (1) the likelihood of detection, (2) the
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likelihood of punishment once detected, or (3) the swiftness of
punishment once detected—or some combination of all three.
Trying to improve results in any or all of these three areas,
however, may increase pressure to limit various constitutional or
procedural rights that stand in the way of doing so. Does Heuer’s
work offer any indication of how people would react to this? More
generally, what conclusions can we draw about the relative
significance of process during a police investigation or even during
behind-the-scenes plea bargaining, as opposed to what the affected
parties experience in a trial setting?
O’Hara discusses the role of victims within the system, but, as
she acknowledges, one troubling fact is that many victims never
make it into the system, for various reasons, some having to do
with their own personalities and some with the system’s view of
them. What can we do, if anything, to create law-enforcement
structures that encourage victims to come forward or encourage
enforcement officials to take seriously all victims who do?
As the foregoing indicates, I have found all three of the
following articles highly interesting and provocative. They
collectively offer a concise introduction to several significant
modern trends and concerns of criminal law scholarship, and both
highlight and document the increasing significance of socialscience work to legal theory and doctrine. Of course, even the best
empirical work cannot resolve the relevant underlying moral
considerations. It can, however, provide invaluable insights as to
how we can achieve our goals and, perhaps, about how to structure
our practical priorities.

